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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper studies the relationship between New Public Management (NPM) and the political re-
cruitment of civil servants. Some claim that NPM has had the unintended effect of muddling the 
politico-administrational divide, rather than the opposite. This argument is elaborated here by the 
suggestion that the managerialism and contractualism of NPM have provided politicians with a 
reason and the means to politicize the civil service by making more political appointments of agen-
cy heads. Since there is not much empirical evidence for this relationship, it is also tested. The test 
is made through a cross-sectional analysis of the politicization of 120 Swedish public agencies in 
2009. The results indicate that politicians do not appoint agency heads with a political background 
more frequently to public agencies with a stronger NPM orientation. Thus, the hypothesis that 
NPM leads to a politicized civil service is not supported. 
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Introduction1 
[T]he best opportunity to steer an agency strategically /…/ is when you ap-
point a new agency head. (Nils Gunnar Billinger, chair of the Swedish public 
enterprise LFV working with air navigation service, quoted in Hård af Seger-
stad 2006, 28) 
The focus of this paper is to explore the consequences of one of the most sweeping administrative 
reforms in the Western world since the 1980s: New Public Management (NPM). One of the basic 
ideas of NPM was to separate the tasks of politicians and civil servants, an idea that goes far back 
to influential scholars such as Max Weber ([1921]1978) and Woodrow Wilson (1887). According to 
the NPM ideal, politicians should be in charge of policy formulation, whereas civil servants should 
handle the implementation of those policies (Hood 1995; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011, 9-11). Such a 
division of labour is expected to result in a more efficient and more flexible public administration, 
in which managers are allowed to manage without the interference of meddling politicians.  
Thus it is somewhat ironic that this reform has been claimed to have had quite the opposite effect, 
unintentionally. Instead of upholding the divide between politicians and civil servants, it may have 
contributed to blurring the roles between these two groups even further in some respects (Rouban 
2012). For example, prominent scholars have made the observation that the share of politically 
appointed civil servants, which is a form of politicization (Horn 1995, 97; Lewis 2008, 32), has in-
creased in countries that have carried out radical NPM reforms (Pierre 2001; Peters and Pierre 
2004b; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011, 180). In order to control the civil service even when they are 
formally not supposed to, politicians may have started recruiting their own kind to leading civil 
servant positions.  
Whether there is a causal relationship between NPM and this politicization trend and, in that case, 
what the causal mechanisms are have not been studied systematically. The purpose of this paper is 
therefore two-fold: 1) to discuss how a potential causal relationship between NPM and politiciza-
tion might be elaborated and 2) to study whether there are reasons to believe that such a relation-
ship actually exists. These two issues are important to look into, since they are “crucial, boundary 
                                                     
1 I would like to thank Carl Dahlström and Christian Björkdahl for sharing their data on DGs and the Swedish Research 
Council for providing the means to collect the survey data. I would also like to thank the following people for their helpful 
comments to earlier drafts of the paper: Carl Dahlström, Georgios Xezonakis, Victor Lapuente, and Astrid Kramer. 
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issues for public management” (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011, 162). Christopher Pollitt and Geert 
Bouckaert (2011, 161) even claim that we cannot adequately comprehend public management with-
out a reference to the relationship between administration and politics, and Luc Rouban (2012) 
points out the effects of NPM on politicization as one of the most intriguing questions to be an-
swered by public administration scholars today. 
From a democratic perspective, it is legitimate for elected politicians to control the activities of the 
public administration since it is politicians and not civil servants who are held accountable for the 
service produced by the public administration (Peters and Pierre 2004a; Rouban 2012). Neutral 
expertise and integrity are thus not the only important virtues of the public administration in a 
democratic society; responsiveness to democratically elected leaders is also important. Some degree 
of politicization of the public administration could therefore serve a democratic purpose.  
In spite of the importance of democratic control over the public administration, most scholars 
today would agree that an administration run solely by party loyalists is likely to have a severe nega-
tive impact on the competence, efficiency and legitimacy of the public administration (Peters and 
Pierre 2004a; Lewis 2008, 143). Furthermore, citizens tend to place a lower degree of trust in their 
political representatives than in bureaucratic institutions (Listhaug and Wiberg 1995), which implies 
that the public administration risks losing legitimacy should the politicization of the civil service be 
taken too far (Peters and Pierre 2004a). Empirical studies also show that countries in which the 
recruitment of civil servants is mainly based on merits instead of political affiliation perform better 
in the sense that they have higher economic growth (Evans and Rauch 1999) and more universal 
welfare systems (Rothstein, Samanni and Teorell 2013) and are less prone to corruption (Rauch and 
Evans 2000; Dahlström, Lapuente and Teorell 2012). It is therefore interesting to study whether 
the NPM model indeed provokes an increased politicization, particularly since there are few sys-
tematic studies of this potential correlation (Peters and Pierre 2004b).  
The purpose of this study is thus to test the causal relationship between NPM and the politicization 
of the civil service, which will be referred to as the NPM hypothesis. The two potential intermedi-
ate variables between NPM and politicization that are teased out from previous research are mana-
gerialism and contractualism. These important aspects of the NPM model may have provided poli-
ticians with an incentive and the means to retrieve some of their lost influence over the implemen-
tation process. The test is based on Swedish data from 2009 that allow for a cross-sectional analysis 
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of public agencies of varying NPM orientation. Agencies with a strong NPM orientation are those 
that the government, following the managerialist ideal, has allowed high degrees of financial and 
Human Resource Management (HRM) autonomy. If the NPM hypothesis is correct, the govern-
ment should have made more political appointments of agency heads (here referred to as Director 
Generals or DGs) to these agencies than to others. The results of this study do not imply that this 
is the case, however. Agencies with higher degrees of financial and HRM autonomy are not run by 
DGs with a political background more frequently than less autonomous agencies.  
The paper is organised as follows: first by defining politicization. The NPM hypothesis is then de-
veloped further, and it is argued that, based on previous research, it is reasonable to believe that the 
managerialism and contractualism promoted by the NPM model have contributed to a politiciza-
tion of the civil service. A brief account of other possible explanations for the politicization trend 
follows. The data are described and the choice of Sweden as a case is motivated before presenting 
the results of the empirical analyses. The paper is concluded with a discussion.  
 
Politicization as Political Appointments 
There are different ways to study the politicization of the public service. This paper concentrates on 
how civil servants are recruited, not on their tasks or on their political sympathies (Aberbach, Put-
nam, and Rockman 1981; Rouban 2012), and it is de facto politicization that is in focus, that is, to 
what extent political recruitments are actually made, not just whether politicians are entitled de jure 
to make them. The point of using this definition of politicization is that it captures how NPM 
might have shifted the border between politics and administration in real life and not just in theory. 
As the introductory quote states, the appointment of DGs is one of the most important measures 
available to executives who wish to control bureaucracy and influence policy (see also Moe 1985; 
Wood and Waterman 1991). The choice of DGs can thus be expected to become more important 
and more politicized when agency autonomy in the implementation process increases (Peters and 
Pierre 2004b).  
In a politicized recruitment process, political criteria replace merit-based criteria in selecting, pro-
moting, rewarding and disciplining public servants (Peters and Pierre 2004a, 2). Civil servants who 
are loyal to, or at least sympathize with, the governing party may be given priority in appointments 
 6 
to leading positions. By placing party loyal people, or people who sympathise with the govern-
ment’s policy ideas on leading administrative positions, the government may ensure that the im-
plementation of political decisions runs smoothly (Peters and Pierre 2004a; Lewis 2008).  
However, party loyalty may not always be the primary aim of political appointments. Moshe Maor 
(1999) observes that the executive may very well appoint politicians from competing parties as 
DGs. In these cases, it is the qualities of having the ‘right’ political contacts and the needed political 
skills that are important. The former DG of the Swedish National Board of Trade, Peter Kleen, 
expresses for example appreciation for civil servants with political experience during an interview 
with Hård af Segerstad (2006, 28): “I thought that it was very valuable to get competence from the 
political sphere, to get people who had worked at the Government Offices and who knew the polit-
ical process.” Knowing the political process allows you to see things from a political perspective 
and understand the political dimensions of an issue so that it becomes clear what to expect from 
your political principal and when it is important to seek political approval (SOU 2011:81). Further-
more, a DG who is politically appointed lacks her own administrative career to fall back upon in 
case of dismissal; she is more dependent on the government for her future career, which is likely to 
make her more loyal to her employer.  
Thus, the recruitment of a DG with any political background is here defined as a politicization of 
the civil service; no attention is paid to whether the political affiliations of the DG and the govern-
ment are the same. 
 
The NPM Hypothesis 
Christopher Hood (2001) compares the NPM reform to “Trobriand cricket”, which means that the 
outcomes of the reform differ from the original intentions. He takes his starting point in the NPM 
ideal, saying that DGs should possess significant discretionary decision-making power during the 
implementation process. From this follows that there must be very limited ex ante approvals and 
process controls. Hood points out that accomplishing a shift from ex ante to ex post control is 
difficult, since it requires that those who previously had the right to ex ante control (the politicians) 
are willing to it give up. There is research indicating that this requirement has not been fulfilled in 
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countries where the NPM model has been adopted. Instead, politicians are suspected of trying to 
increase their control over the implementation process through a politicization of the civil service.  
The first purpose of this paper is to tease out what aspects of NPM might have caused the reform 
to turn into Trobriand cricket. On the basis of previous research, it is argued that the contractual-
ism and managerialism of the NPM model could be a fruitful way of elaborating the causal chain 
between NPM and politicization of the civil service. 
 
Contractualism 
Contractualism provides politicians with the means to politicize civil servant positions, since they 
are allowed greater freedom to choose the DGs of their liking. One basic idea of the NPM model is 
that the public sector should become more like the private sector. Traditional bureaucratic virtues 
like equity, universalism, personal responsibility, professionalism, safety and resilience should be 
replaced by the principles of competition, specialisation, efficiency and flexibility (Christensen and 
Lægreid 2001; Pollitt 2002). For instance, the employments and careers of civil servants should not 
be too secure in order that the political control is strengthened and the civil service is made more 
productive and responsive.   
Consequently, the employment and career situations for civil servants in countries that have adopt-
ed the NPM model have changed considerably. Senior civil servants are no longer automatically 
appointed to the most prestigious public service positions, since promotions are based on competi-
tion and not on tenure. Furthermore, those who are appointed DGs can rarely count on holding 
their positions for more than a fixed term of 3-6 years (see Maor 1999; Christen and Lægreid 2001; 
Amosa 2008; Skr. 2009/10:43). Contractualism has thus made it easier for the government to make 
appointments according to their own wishes; the new DG does not even need to be recruited from 
the civil service. She can be recruited from other spheres, like the private sector or politics.  
A greater share of DGs with a political background is therefore not an unlikely consequence of 
contractualism, although no studies have shown that this relationship exists empirically. In a case 
study of how new employment and career conditions related to the NPM reform have affected the 
appointments of DGs in Samoa, Desmond Uelese Amosa (2008) concludes that Samoa’s public 
service is far from being heavily politicized. Amosa adds however that “in the few cases where 
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there is clear evidence of politicization in the form of partisan appointment, the situation is intri-
guing, daunting and contentious” (Amosa 2008, 617). He refers to the risk that not the most quali-
fied individual gets the job and that the advice to the government becomes less sincere and critical.  
In spite of these risks, politicizing DG positions might be a route that the government is forced, 
rather than chooses, to take. The insecure employment conditions following contractualism have 
made the civil service a less attractive work place (Maor 1999; SOU 2011:81). A civil service job 
rarely pays as well as a similar job in the private sector, but it used to come with other advantages, 
such as job and career security. As a consequence of NPM, the work conditions in public service 
have become more like those in the private sector, but the salaries and other benefits still lag be-
hind. Politicians and civil servants now testify that it can be hard to find suitable candidates to DG 
positions and even harder to persuade them to actually take the job (Hård av Segerstad 2006, 29; 
see also KU 1996/97:KU25, app. B9): Thus, when civil servants and private enterprise managers 
prove unwilling or unsuitable, who is left but politicians to run agencies? 
 
Managerialism 
Whereas contractualism increases politicians’ possibilities to politicize the civil service, managerial-
ism provides them with a reason to do so. NPM is a double-edged sword, as Christensen and 
Lægreid (2001) point out. Politicians are allowed more control over some stages of the policy pro-
cess, but they are more restrained in others, particularly in the implementation stage, in which the 
DGs should be left to run the agencies according to their own judgment. This NPM idea of agency 
autonomy is sometimes referred to as managerialism (Christensen and Lægreid 2001) and it is not 
unlikely that this aspect of NPM has created a need among politicians to regain some control over 
the implementation process by politicizing the civil service. 
At least two kinds of agency autonomy are relevant here: financial autonomy and HRM autonomy 
(Verhoest et al. 2004; Verhoest et al. 2010). Financial autonomy is when an agency has the authority 
to handle its allocated funds as it pleases. An agency that 1) is free to redistribute money between 
different budget posts, 2) can save money for the following budget period,or 3) even use its allotted 
money to make investments enjoys a great deal of financial autonomy. It is plausible that a gov-
ernment wants to ensure that agencies that are allowed high degrees of financial autonomy are 
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trustworthy and that they spend their money in a way that is in line with the government’s inten-
tions, particularly if the government has invested a great deal of money in those agencies. Govern-
ments could therefore be tempted to politicize the DG positions of highly financially autonomous 
agencies. 
HRM autonomy refers to the employment and organisation of staff members, which is an im-
portant aspect of the implementation process (Verhoest et al. 2004). How many civil servants 
should be involved in this process and how should they be so? What incentives (e.g. salary increas-
es, promotions etc.) are used to motivate civil servants to perform their very best? Decisions on 
these matters are likely to affect the efficiency and quality of the public service available to the citi-
zens and, since the legitimacy of the government and its public administration relies to a great ex-
tent on people’s experiences of how public service is delivered (Esaiasson 2010), politicians have an 
interest in making sure that the implementation process runs smoothly. Appointing DGs with a 
political background may be one way of achieving this. 
In his comparative study of the increasingly insecure employment situations of civil servants fol-
lowing the NPM reforms in the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Malta, Canada and Austria, Maor 
(1999) claims that “the more authority and discretion public managers are given to manage pro-
grams, the less secure political executives want them to be” (Maor 1999, 6). Individual and fixed-
term contracts play one part in this game, but politicians also use other measures, like political re-
cruitments, in order to make the situation and status of the civil servants even more uncertain. 
One might wonder however why politicians would bother to launch a major administrative reform 
like NPM that limits their control over the civil service if they have no intention of giving up this 
control in the first place. As Christensen and Lægreid (2001) point out, it is quite possible that gov-
ernments carry out NPM reforms because they are pressured into it or because they do not under-
stand what consequences these reforms might have for their possibilities to control the implemen-
tation process. When this realisation dawns upon them, they might try to regain controlcontrary 
to the intentions of the reformand do so using the tools that the new administrative system of-
fers them.  
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The Hypothesis 
To sum up, the contractualism and managerialism prescribed by NPM entail that appointments to 
top positions and evaluations of the civil service are centralized to the politicians (contractualism) 
and the implementation of policies is delegated to the civil servants (managerialism). This combina-
tion of centralization and devolution has arguably provided politicians with a reason as well as the 
means to try to regain control over the implementation process by making political appointments 
of DGs. Contractualism and managerialism might thus be the reasons why NPM could result in 
greater politicization of the civil service. 
The second purpose of this paper is therefore to test this NPM hypothesis: in public administrations 
where 1) the government is free to appoint the DGs of its liking on individual fixed-term contracts and 2) these DGs 
enjoy a great deal of financial and HRM autonomy in the management of their agencies, the recruitment of DGs with 
a political background will increase. 
The actual empirical test here focuses on the relationship between the level of autonomy of agen-
cies and the degree to which they are politicized. Agency autonomy refers to financial and HRM 
autonomy if nothing else is specified. Contractualism (condition 1 of the hypothesis) will thus be 
treated as a contextual variable that facilitates politicization. Managerialism (condition 2 of the hy-
pothesis), on the other hand, is assumed to drive it.  
 
Other Explanations to Politicization 
The NPM hypothesis is only one—and a relatively unexplored—explanation for the level of politi-
cization of the civil service. There are other explanations that have received much more attention, 
and these will be discussed in this section. The examples brought up are those that have been 
claimed to explain the degree of politicization of public agencies and their autonomy. These expla-
nations are particularly relevant here since they might cause spurious effects if overlooked in the 
analysis of the NPM hypothesis.  
There are at least three different kinds of variables related to the autonomy and politicization of 
public agencies. These are variables that refer to 1) the external relationships of the agencies, 2) the 
tasks of the agencies and 3) the organisational structures of the agencies. 
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External Relationships 
The NPM idea is that control should primarily be carried out ex post (e.g. through reporting and 
evaluations), which will allow for a great deal of ex ante autonomy of the agency instead. The NPM 
hypothesis tested in this paper assumes that the ex post controls used in NPM administrations do 
not satisfy politicians’ need for control and that they therefore use politicization as a means instead. 
However, we should be open to the possibility that ex post controls are indeed considered good 
enough control mechanisms by politicians and take into account to what extent agencies are put 
through ex post controls, since this factor might affect agencies’ levels of ex ante autonomy as well 
as the extent to which politicians perceive a need to politicize them.  
Another external factor that might affect the level of autonomy of an agency is the public attention 
attracted by that agency. An agency that faces a great deal of external criticism in parliament, by 
other public agencies or NGOs, or in the media, might also draw the critical eye of the govern-
ment. Being the institution that is held democratically accountable for the achievements of the pub-
lic agencies, the government is likely to allow less autonomy to an agency that appears to have 
problems handling its commission satisfactorily (Lægreid et al. 2006). On the other hand, if the 
public attention is mainly positive, the government might be willing to allow the agency even great-
er degrees of autonomy than normal (Niklasson and Pierre 2012). Either way, the government has 
an interest in making sure that an agency that spends a lot of time in the limelight is led by a DG 
that they trust, e.g. somebody with a political background. 
 
Agency Task 
Agency task is another factor that is often related to the autonomy of public agencies. For example, 
agencies with regulating tasks are often said to enjoy greater autonomy than those mainly dealing with 
general public services or defence (Epstein & O'Halloran 1999; Bendor et al. 2001; Huber and 
Shipan 2002; Pollack 2002; Verhoest et al. 2010; and Yee 2011). The government has a greater in-
terest in ensuring that regulatory agencies appear to act independently of the political leadership, so 
that they may harmonise with a policy field that is largely dominated by private and international 
corporations. It is also a matter of convincing free market actors of the long-term stability and ob-
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jectivity of the economic policies implemented. Governments can therefore be expected to be less 
prone to try to politicise these agencies, even though these agencies are also likely to enjoy a high 
degree of autonomy.  
Other kinds of tasks may on the other hand decrease the autonomy of an agency. According to the 
study by Verhoest et al. (2010), agencies dealing with social welfare policies (housing, health, recreation, 
culture, religion, education and social security) display lower autonomy. This might be because this 
policy field has a large impact on people’s everyday lives and thus tends to be strongly correlated 
with the popular support for the government. Consequently, the government is less willing to give 
up control over these agencies. Swedish agencies dealing with social welfare issues have also been 
pointed out to be particularly politicized (Rothstein 2005).  
 
Agency Structure 
The last category of control variables is that related to agency structure. As Verhoest et al. (2010) 
point out, agencies with much resources, for example when it comes to staff and budget, are more 
able to act autonomously. One might also expect the government to take a greater interest in con-
trolling agencies that have a lot of resources, particularly if their activities are costly to the state 
(Verhoest et al., 2010). Thus, the government is more likely to politicize the DGs of large agencies 
than small ones.  
The last variable related to agency structure is the existence of an agency board. This variable has 
frequently been identified as having a positive impact on agency autonomy (Christensen and 
Lægreid 1999; Yesilkagit & Christensen 2010; Verhoest et al. 2010; Painter and Yee 2011). The 
agency board works as an extra layer through which the information and control exercised by the 
political leadership has to filter. During this process, the information might become muddled or 
muffled. The DG is also likely to be able to take a stronger stand against the government and the 
parent department in cases of disagreement if she has an agency board supporting her than if she 
stands alone. The government could therefore be more interested in politicizing the DGs of agen-
cies that have an agency board. 
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Data 
The empirical analysis in this paper focuses on the relationship between the political recruitment of 
DGs and the level of financial and HRM autonomy of 120 public agencies in Sweden in 2009. This 
analysis is rendered possible through a unique combination of two original data sets: one of the 
political backgrounds of Swedish DGs (Dahlström and Bergdahl 2012) and one of the autonomy 
and control of Swedish agencies (Niklasson 2009).  
 
The Data on DGs 
The analyses will include only the absolute top positions of the public administration. This is a rea-
sonable limitation, as previous studies have shown that the political appointees at the top of an 
agency make a significant difference in how that agency performs (Wood and Waterman 1991; 
Krause, Lewis, and Douglas 2006; Lewis 2007). More important to the research design, however, is 
that these top positions are under the direct control of the Swedish executive, which is not the case 
further down the administrative hierarchy (RRV 1996, 207-209). Since the NPM hypothesis pre-
dicts that politicians will try to regain control by making political appointments of civil servants, it is 
crucial that the politicians are actually in command of the civil servant positions analysed. The da-
taset thus includes all Swedish agencies with DGs appointed by the government. For convenience, 
all the heads of these public agencies will be referred to as DGs, even though they in reality have 
different titles such as landshövding (county governor), rektor (vice-chancellor), ordförande (chair), 
direktör (director), kanslichef (administrative director) and överintendent (superintendent) (Skr. 
2009/10:43). 
The information on the political background of the DGs is collected from several sources. The two 
main sources are 1) a yearly publication including information about all Swedish agencies (Sveriges 
statskalender, various years) and 2) the Swedish version of the reference publication “Who is Who?” 
(Vem är det?, various years), which includes biographical information on most DGs. These sources 
have been complemented with other biographical information on DGs or information on Swedish 
agencies (e.g. Statsliggaren, various years; Statliga myndigheter, 1975, 1980, 1986, 1989; Fakta om folkval-
da, various years; Enkammarriksdagen, various years), as well as with CVs for DGs provided through 
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personal communications with agencies or former DGs (see Dahlström and Björkdahl 2012 for 
details). The dataset includes information on the political backgrounds of 217 DGs in 2009. 
A DG is perceived to have a political affiliation if he or she has 1) served as minister, 2) been elect-
ed to Parliament or a local democratic assembly, 3) been State secretary, 4) been employed as politi-
cal advisor at the Government Offices or 5) been employed by a political party or an organization 
clearly associated with a political party, such as the blue collar union confederation, LO. A DG that 
has any of these experiences will be coded as 1. Everybody else will be coded as 0. The dependent 
variable is thus a dummy variable.  
The definition of political affiliation applied here is fairly narrow, since it requires that a person has 
officially worked for a party. A broader definition would also include party activity on a voluntary 
basis, or perhaps even passive membership. Showing up in the right membership rolls, or being 
known to support the party, might increase your chances of becoming a DG, even if you have nev-
er played an active party role. The problem, however, is that the membership lists of Swedish polit-
ical parties are not official. Furthermore, those who are well known in the party are likely to enjoy a 
greater advantage than those who are just passive supporters. It is therefore reasonable to carry out 
this early empirical test of the NPM hypothesis on a more exclusive party group. If there is an ef-
fect for this group, it might be relevant to develop the analysis further and see whether less party 
involved supporters are also favoured. 
 
The Data on Agency Autonomy 
The information on DGs’ political backgrounds is combined with the data from a COBRA (Com-
parative Public Organisation Data Base for Research and Analysis) survey carried out between No-
vember 2008 and April 2009. The survey was directed to the DGs of all Swedish agencies that 1) 
are directly responsible to the government, as opposed to being responsible to the Parliament or to 
another central agency (RF ch11§6) and 2) have their own staff. These agencies fulfil at least some 
of basic prerequisites that should enable them to act autonomously. They possess, for example, “a 
distinctive area of competence, a clearly demarcated clientele or membership, and undisputed juris-
diction over a function, service, goal, issue or cause” (Clark & Wilson, quoted in Downs, 1967, 
157). Consequently, the sample includes county administrative boards, county police authorities, 
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county archives, state enterprises, universities and colleges, museums and general public agencies. A 
total of 256 agencies were included and 181 answered the survey, which equals a response rate of 
71 percent.  
In the survey, the DGs were asked to what extent they perceive that their agencies enjoy financial 
and HRM autonomy in relation to their parent ministry. Financial autonomy is then measured 
through an additive index (0-1) that captures the extent to which the agency has the authority to 
shift funds allocated for staff over to running expenses and shift allocated funds for staff and run-
ning expenses to investments. This index is constituted by two survey questions (see table A1 in the 
appendix for details) that are significantly correlated with each other (Spearman’s Rho=0.593, 
p=0.000). The survey questions all load on the same dimension in an unrotated factor analysis (fac-
tor loadings=0.896), using Kaiser’s criterion. Cronbach’s alpha for the index is 0.749.  
HRM autonomy is also measured through an additive index (0-1) that captures the extent to which 
the agency has the authority to set general guidelines for salaries, promotions, evaluations, hiring 
and firing of staff. This index is constituted by five survey questions (see table A1 in the appendix 
for details) that are significantly correlated with each other (Spearman’s Rho>0.520, p=0.000). The 
survey questions all load on the same dimension in an unrotated factor analysis (factor load-
ings>0.766), using Kaiser’s criterion. Cronbach’s alpha for the index is 0.879. The index is not 
normally distributed; there is a strong bias towards the higher values.  
Using the factor scores of the individual items instead of the two additive indexes has also been 
tested. This does not change the main results. The simpler additive indexes will therefore be used in 
the analyses, since there is no actual theoretical motivation for giving greater weight to some of the 
items than others. 
 
Further Notes on the Analysis 
The analysis presented in Results includes 120 public agencies, since there is no available data on 
the political backgrounds of the DGs, the financial and HRM autonomy of the agencies, and all 
control variables (see tables A1 and A2 in the appendix) for more than this number. The number 
and kinds of agencies included in the analyses are shown in table 1. 
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TABLE 1, AGENCIES IN THE ANALYSIS (PERCENT)   
Agency type Survey sample Analyses 
Colleges and Universities 14 
(36) 
19 
(23) 
County administrative boards 8 
(21) 
8 
(10) 
Museums 3 
(8) 
6 
(7) 
State enterprises 2 
(4) 
1 
(1) 
Regional police authorities 8 
(21) 
8 
(10) 
County archives 3 
(7) 
0 
(0) 
General public services 62 
(159) 
58 
(69) 
All 100 
(256) 
100 
(120) 
Note: Figures in parentheses represent numbers. 
 
As shown in table 1, the proportion of agencies used in the analysis is not representative of the 
Swedish agency landscape. General public services agencies are somewhat underrepresented, for 
example, and county archives are not included at all. It is important to keep in mind, however, that 
the purpose of the analysis is not to draw general conclusions regarding the level of politicization in 
Sweden; it is to test the relationship between politicization and agency autonomy. Therefore, the 
representativeness of our sample is not a major concern as long as the analysis also includes con-
trols for factors that might affect the results regarding this causal relationship.  
There are two kinds of public agencies that deserve a special note in the Swedish context: the uni-
versities and colleges and the county administrative boards. Table 1 shows that colleges and univer-
sities are overrepresented in our analyses. This group of agencies constitute only 14 percent of 
Swedish agencies, but they make up 19 percent of the agencies included in the analyses. In Sweden, 
universities stand out by enjoying greater autonomy than other kinds of agencies. Even though the 
government formally appoints the DGs, the selection process is actually made by the universities 
(Skr. 2009/10:43, 5; see also SOU 2008:104, ch3). Political appointments of university and college 
DGs can therefore be expected to be lower than for other kinds of agencies. A dummy variable for 
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colleges and universities will therefore be used in the analyses, since this group of agencies is 
overrepresented and also likely to contradict the NPM hypothesis. 
The DGs of the Swedish county administrative boards are well known to be politicized to a greater 
degree than other kinds of DGs (Sandahl 2003, 67; Niklasson 2007). The government is also more 
hesitant to open up the recruitment process of these DGs, which they have proved willing to do 
for most other DG positions. They motivate this by saying that the position as county governor is 
“special and demands qualities that do not always coincide with those normally associated with 
DGs. Intimate knowledge and insights in the political system might be one such quality” (Skr. 
2009/10:43, 22). County administrative boards have no agency boards, however. They should 
therefore be less autonomous than other agencies. Thus, county administrative boards are unlikely 
to confirm the NPM hypothesis; previous research indicates that they are less autonomous but 
more politicized than other agencies. A dummy variable for county administrative boards will there-
fore be included in the analyses. 
 
The Swedish Context 
Sweden as a country case offers a great opportunity to test the NPM hypothesis. The ideas of NPM 
have contributed to a thorough reform of the Swedish public administration, both with regard to 
the contractualist and the managerialist aspects. The job security of DGs has, for example, devel-
oped in a typical contractualist direction. Formal competence requirements have been lowered in 
order to broaden the recruitment base and raise the competition for higher public offices. Previous-
ly, it was primarily time in service that was rewarded through the appointments of DGs but, from 
1985, competence was given greater weight (Prop. 1986/87:99; RRV 1996, 210). The time period 
for renewed DG contracts was also shortened and the average time served as a DG sank from 11 
years between 1964 and 1983 (RRV 1996, 219) to seven years in 1988-2001 (SOU 2011:81, 68). 
Furthermore, the government gained the authority to remove a DG from office should this be 
considered necessary for the good of the agency.  
While the employment situation for DGs has become increasingly insecure, the HRM autonomy of 
public agencies has moved in the opposite direction. In the middle of the 1960s, the government 
proclaimed, for example, that it was going to delegate the recruitment of all agency positions below 
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the unit level to the agencies; later, in 1995, the government limited itself to appoint the DG (RRV 
1996, 207-208). Agencies have also gained greater financial autonomy. Instead of supervising every 
single decision on expenses, the government has gradually moved towards allotting a budget that 
the agencies are free to use almost as they see fit, as long as they achieve the agency goals formulat-
ed by the government (Sundström 2003, 327; SOU 2007:75, ch3).  
Managerialist and contractualist reforms have thus been carried out in Sweden since the 1960s 
(Sundström 2003; SOU 2007:75, ch3) and now permeate the administrative system entirely (Hood 
1995; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011, 306). There is some variation in autonomy between the different 
agencies, however (see table A1 in the appendix). It is therefore possible to test the NPM hypothe-
sis that the more autonomous agencies should also be the most politicized ones. Furthermore, if 
NPM reforms motivate governments to politicize the civil service in order to regain some control 
over the public service, Sweden is a likely case, given the far-reaching NPM reforms that have taken 
place there. Testing the hypothesis on an easy case seems reasonable at this point, since it has not 
been tested much before.  
 
Results 
It is now time to test the NPM hypothesis. This will be done through logged regressions, since the 
dependent variable—politicization—is a dummy. The perceived financial and HRM autonomy of 
public agencies constitute the two main independent variables. These have been tested separately, 
but they will be discussed together, since the results from the analyses are almost identical. If the 
hypothesis is correct, the agencies that are perceived to enjoy the greatest autonomy should also be 
the ones that are headed by politically recruited DGs. 
It may be worth noting that it is fairly common that DGs in Sweden are recruited from politics (see 
also Dahlström and Niklasson, forthcoming). Table A1 in the appendix shows that 26 percent of all 
the DGs in 2009 had a political background. The question is then if they are mainly appointed to 
certain kinds of agencies. 
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TABLE 2, LOGGED REGRESSION OF FINANCIAL AUTONOMY AND POLITICIZATION 
 Model 1: 
Autonomy 
Model 2: 
External 
Model 3: 
Task 
Model 4: 
Structure 
Model 5: 
Agency type 
Model 6: 
All variables 
 b Exp 
(B) 
b Exp 
(B) 
b Exp 
(B) 
b Exp 
(B) 
b Exp 
(B) 
b Exp 
(B) 
Constant -.554 
(.479) 
.575 -.747 
(.834) 
.474 -.351 
(.559) 
.704 -
3.788*** 
(1.440) 
.023 -.907* 
(.546) 
.404 -3.017* 
(1.676) 
.049 
Financial 
autonomy 
-.923 
(.692) 
.397 -.719 
(.725) 
.487 -.847 
(.703) 
.429 -.896 
(.723) 
.408 -.469 
(.764) 
.626 -.436 
(.814) 
.647 
External 
relationships 
            
Public 
attention 
  .448 
(1.057) 
1.566       -.208 
(1.292) 
.812 
Ex post 
control: 
reporting 
  .851 
(.909) 
2.342       .273 
(1.059) 
1.313 
Ex post 
control: 
evaluation 
  -1.477 
(1.420) 
.228       -1.317 
(1.720) 
.254 
Task  
variables 
            
Regulatory 
task 
    .462 
(.494) 
1.587     -.285 
(.637) 
.752 
Social welfare 
policies 
    -.719 
(.441) 
.487     -.508 
(.542) 
.602 
Structural 
variables 
            
Budget 
(logged) 
      6.456*** 
(2.500) 
636.460   5.200* 
(2.810) 
181.274 
Agency  
board 
      -
1.530*** 
(.585) 
.216   -.592 
(.705) 
.553 
Agency type             
County  
admin. board 
        2.548*** 
(.834) 
12.781 2.621*** 
(.928) 
13.755 
University or 
college 
        -1.844* 
(1.056) 
.158 -1.256 
(1.273) 
.285 
Cox & Snell 
R square 
.015 .036 .047 .095 .161 .201 
Nagelkerke R 
square  
.022 .054 .070 .143 .240 .300 
N 120 120 120 120 120 120 
Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is a dummy (0-1). A detailed 
description of the variables can be found in the appendix in tables A1 and A2. All models are based on the same respondents: those 
for whom there is valid information on all the variables included in model 6.  
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TABLE 3, LOGGED REGRESSION OF HRM AUTONOMY AND POLITICIZATION 
 Model 1: 
Autonomy  
variable 
Model 2: 
External 
Model 3: 
Task 
Model 4: 
Structure 
Model 5: 
Agency type 
Model 6: 
All variables 
 b Exp 
(B) 
b Exp 
(B) 
b Exp 
(B) 
b Exp 
(B) 
b Exp 
(B) 
b Exp 
(B) 
Constant -.991 
(1.098) 
.371 -.688 
(1.334) 
.503 -.590 
(1.173) 
.555 -
3.480** 
(1.650) 
.031 -1.083 
(1.297) 
.339 -3.030 
(1.953) 
.048 
HRM 
autonomy 
-.248 
(1.280) 
.780 -.433 
(1.287) 
.648 -.514 
(1.309) 
.598 -1.074 
(1.326) 
.342 -.236 
(1.456) 
.790 -.615 
(1.500) 
.540 
External 
variables 
            
Public atten-
tion 
  .119 
(1.016) 
1.126       -.863 
(1.268) 
.422 
Ex post 
control: 
reporting 
  .933 
(.896) 
2.543       .174 
(1.065) 
1.190 
Ex post 
control: 
evaluation 
  -1.701 
(1.400) 
.182       -1.502 
(1.713) 
.223 
Task  
variables 
            
Regulatory 
task 
    .528 
(.488) 
1.696     -.124 
(.635) 
.883 
Social welfare 
policies 
    -.617 
(.445) 
.540     -.350 
(.544) 
.704 
Structural 
variables 
            
Budget 
(logged) 
      6.337** 
(2.489) 
565.201   5.922* 
(2.921) 
373.277 
Agency board       -1.485*** 
(.580) 
.226   -.386 
(.702) 
.680 
Agency type             
County 
admin. board 
        2.653*** 
(.843) 
14.196 2.715*** 
(.949) 
15.100 
University or 
college 
        -1.831* 
(1.070) 
.160 -1.534 
(1.285) 
.216 
Cox & Snell 
R square 
.000 .023 .029 .079 .159 .200 
Nagelkerke 
R square  
.000 .035 .044 .119 .240 .303 
N 121 121 121 121 121 121 
Notes: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***=p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is a dummy (0-1). A de-
tailed description of the variables can be found in the appendix in tables 2 and 3. All models are based on the same respondents: 
those for whom there is information on all the variables included in model 6. 
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We can see in tables 2 and 3 that not many of the independent variables in the analysis have any 
effect on the degree of politicization. The main focus here—financial and HRM autonomy—point 
in a negative direction; those agencies that claim to enjoy the greatest degree of financial and HRM 
autonomy tend to be less politicized, that is, the opposite of what the NPM hypothesis predicts. 
However, the effect is far from being significant in any of the six models.  
One variable that does display a significant effect on the politicization of DGs is county administra-
tive boards. There is a much greater chance that a DG of a county administrative board has a polit-
ical background than other DGs. The existence of an agency board appears to have a negative ef-
fect in model 4, but this effect disappears when county administrative boards are included in the 
analysis in model 6. The reason is that no county administrative boards have agency boards. The 
conclusion that it is actually the agency type that matters and not the lack of an agency board is 
confirmed by a control analysis in which the type of agency is kept constant. Since there is a fairly 
large group of general public service agencies (see table 1), the analyses in table 2 were re-run only 
on this group in order to control for sample bias. This analysis shows that agency board has no 
significant effect on politicization in model 4 or model 6. 
Another variable that has a significant effect is budget. The larger the budget, the greater is the 
chance that an agency is headed by a politically appointed DG, which is in line with expectations. 
This relationship holds even under control for agency type. Budget is only one indicator of agency 
size discussed in previous studies, however. The number of employees is also often mentioned. 
Staff size has therefore been included in a number of control analyses, but is not included in tables 
2 and 3, since it 1) displays no significant effects and 2) correlates strongly with budget (Spearman’s 
Rho=0.794, p=0.000), which causes a high level of multicolinearity in the model.  
As predicted, universities appear to have a negative effect on politicization, at least in model 5. This 
effect is no longer significant in model 6, however. The reason is that this variable is positively cor-
related with social welfare tasks and negatively correlated with regulatory tasks and agency boards. 
Collinearity statistics show that the tolerance for the university variable when all these other varia-
bles are included in the analysis is only 0.431. If these variables are excluded from the analysis, 
however, the tolerance increases to 0.799 and universities have a significant (p=0.079) negative 
effect (Ex(B)=0.144) on politicization in model 6 as well. 
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Conclusion 
The spread and implementation of the NPM reform have occupied quite a few public administra-
tion scholars over the last two decades. Our knowledge of the consequences of this reform is much 
more limited, however. Some prominent researchers have predicted that NPM will lead to an in-
creased politicization of the civil service. The first purpose of this paper was to elaborate how such 
a relationship could work. Based on previous studies, it is suggested that the managerial and con-
tractualist aspects of NPM have provided politicians with a reason and the means to politicize the 
civil service. This is referred to as the NPM hypothesis. 
The second purpose of this paper was to test the NPM hypothesis. The empirical test is carried out 
on 120 Swedish agencies, for which the combination of two original datasets enables analyses of 
the effect that the self-reported financial and HRM autonomy of the agencies have on the political 
recruitment of their DGs. If the NPM hypothesis is correct, politically recruited DGs should be 
more common at agencies that enjoy high degrees of autonomy. This does not turn out to be the 
case, however. Neither financial nor HRM autonomy appear to be significantly correlated to the 
DGs’ political backgrounds at all. Thus, this study does not find any support for the NPM hypoth-
esis.  
However, it may be fruitful to test this hypothesis in a context where there is a greater variation in 
financial and HRM autonomy between different agencies. Even though there is variation in Sweden 
as well, Swedish agencies generally enjoy a fairly high degree of autonomy in an international per-
spective (Niklasson 2012). 
It is also worth mentioning that the study confirms what previous studies have shown regarding 
county administrative boards and universities in Sweden. County governors (county administrative 
boards) are more frequently recruited from the political sphere than the average DG, whereas vice 
chancellors (universities) are much less so. 
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APPENDIX  
TABLE A1, VARIABLES INCLUDED BASED ON SURVEY DATA 
VARIABLE SURVEY QUESTIONS POSSIBLE ANSWERS   MEDIAN STD. 
DIV. 
MIN. MAX. N 
Financial 
autonomy 
See financial autonomy is an 
additive and normalized 
index based on variables 1-2 
below. The survey question 
ran: “To what extent can the 
agency make decisions 
regarding the following 
things, independently of the 
government and the parent 
ministry:” 
Low financial autonomy (0) – 
high financial autonomy (1) 
.63 
(.66) 
.63 
(.75) 
.31 
(.30) 
0 
(0) 
1 
(1) 
165 
(120) 
Financial 
autonomy 
variable 1 
Shift the allotted funds 
between staff and running 
costs 
To a very great extent (1), to 
a great extent, to some 
extent, to a low extent, not at 
all (0) 
.73 
(.76) 
.75 
(.75) 
.32 
(.30) 
0 
(0) 
1 
(1) 
165 
(120) 
Financial 
autonomy 
variable 2 
Shift the allotted funds 
between staff or running 
costs and investments 
To a very great extent (1), to 
a great extent, to some 
extent, to a low extent, not at 
all (0) 
.53 
(.56) 
.50 
(.50) 
.37 
(.38) 
0 
(0) 
1 
(1) 
167 
(120) 
HRM 
autonomy 
HRM autonomy is an additive 
and normalized index based 
on variables 1-5 below. The 
survey question ran: “To what 
extent may the agency, 
independently of the govern-
ment, make decisions on the 
general conditions of em-
ployees regarding the follow-
ing issues in practise?” 
Low HRM autonomy (0) – 
high HRM autonomy (1) 
.83 
(.84) 
.85 
(.85) 
.17 
(.17) 
0 
(.05) 
1 
(1) 
167 
(121) 
HRM 
autonomy 
variable 1 
Raise the salary  To a very great extent (1), to 
a great extent, to some 
extent, to a low extent, not at 
all (0) 
.86 
(.87) 
1.00 
(1.00) 
.19 
(.19) 
0 
(0) 
1 
(1) 
170 
(121) 
HRM 
autonomy 
variable 2 
Promote  To a very great extent (1), to 
a great extent, to some 
extent, to a low extent, not at 
all (0) 
.82 
(.82) 
1.00 
(1.00) 
.22 
(.23) 
0 
(0) 
1 
(1) 
170 
(121) 
HRM 
autonomy 
variable 3 
Evaluate  To a very great extent (1), to 
a great extent, to some 
extent, to a low extent, not at 
all (0) 
.87 
(.88) 
1.00 
(1.00) 
.17 
(.16) 
0 
(0) 
1 
(1) 
169 
(121) 
HRM 
autonomy 
variable 4 
Hire  To a very great extent (1), to 
a great extent, to some 
extent, to a low extent, not at 
all (0) 
.82 
(.83) 
.75 
(1.00) 
.21 
(.20) 
0 
(0) 
1 
(1) 
169 
(121) 
HRM 
autonomy 
variable 5 
Fire  To a very great extent (1), to 
a great extent, to some 
extent, to a low extent, not at 
all (0) 
.80 
(.82) 
.75 
(1.00) 
.23 
(.21) 
.25 
(.25) 
1 
(1) 
168 
(121) 
Public 
attention 
See public attention variables 
1-4 below. The survey ques-
tion ran: “To what degree has 
the agency been subjected to 
political and public attention 
during the passed five years:” 
The values of these four 
variables have been added 
and then divided by 4. The 
survey questions are signifi-
cantly correlated (Spe-
0-1 .45 
(.47) 
(.48) 
.44 
(.44) 
(.44) 
.24 
(.23) 
(.23) 
0 
(.06) 
(.06) 
1 
(1) 
(1) 
158 
(120) 
(121) 
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arman’s rho>0.406, p=0.000) 
and they load on the same 
dimension in an unrotated 
factor analysis (factor loa-
dings>0.729), using Kaiser’s 
criterion. Cronbach’s alpha is 
0.779. 
Public 
attention 
variable 1 
Parliamentarian control 
(interpellations, questions, 
hearings, changes in eco-
nomic allowances) 
To a very high degree (1), to 
a high degree, to a certain 
degree, to a low degree, not 
at all (0) 
0.40 
(.43) 
(.43) 
0.50 
(.50) 
(.50) 
0.33 
(.32) 
(.32) 
0 
(0) 
(0) 
1 
(1) 
(1) 
164 
(120) 
(121) 
Public 
attention 
variable 2 
Legal initiatives (bills, de-
grees) 
To a very high degree (1), to 
a high degree, to a certain 
degree, to a low degree, not 
at all (0) 
.41 
(.41) 
(.42) 
.50 
(.50) 
(.50) 
.36 
(.37) 
(.38) 
0 
(0) 
(0) 
1 
(1) 
(1) 
159 
(120) 
(121) 
Public 
attention 
variable 3 
Media coverage To a very high degree (1), to 
a high degree, to a certain 
degree, to a low degree, not 
at all (0) 
.70 
(.72) 
(.73) 
.75 
(.75) 
(.75) 
.26 
(.25) 
(.25) 
0 
(.25) 
(.25) 
1 
(1) 
(1) 
171 
(120) 
(121) 
Public 
attention 
variable 4 
External criticism (e.g. by 
NGOs, public agencies, EU 
institutions) 
To a very high degree (1), to 
a high degree, to a certain 
degree, to a low degree, not 
at all (0) 
.31 
(.30) 
(.32) 
.25 
(.25) 
(.25) 
.27 
(.25) 
(.26) 
0 
(0) 
(0) 
1 
(1) 
(1) 
167 
(120) 
(121) 
Ex post 
control: 
Reporting 
How often does the agency 
report results and achieved 
goals (other than purely 
financial ones) to the gov-
ernment or the parent minis-
try? 
Every month or more fre-
quently (1), every 2-4 month, 
once every sixth month, once 
a year, less than once a year 
(0) 
.44 
(.45) 
(.44) 
.25 
(.25) 
(.25) 
.26 
(.25) 
(.25) 
0 
(0) 
(0) 
1 
(1) 
(1) 
173 
(120) 
(121) 
Ex post 
control: 
Evaluation 
By whom are the results and 
goal achievements (other 
than purely financial) of the 
agency evaluated? More than 
one answer is possible. 
The agency itself 
The government or the 
parent ministry 
Third party assigned by the 
agency 
Third party assigned by the 
government or parent minis-
try 
Third party assigned by the 
Parliament 
Other 
The number of items indicat-
ed by the respondent have 
been added and normalized 
so that six actors indicated=1 
and none=0. 
.38 
(.38) 
(.38) 
.33 
(.33) 
(.33) 
.17 
(.17) 
(.17) 
0 
(.17) 
(.17) 
1 
(1) 
(1) 
174 
(120) 
(121) 
Regulatory 
task 
What is the primary task of 
the agency? Choose one 
task. 
– Supervi-
sion/regulation/control 
Other kinds of tasks (0), 
supervision/regulation/control 
(1) 
.22 
(.23) 
(.23) 
.00 
(.00) 
(.00) 
.42 
(.41) 
(.42) 
0 
(0) 
(0) 
1 
(1) 
(1) 
171 
(120) 
(121) 
Social 
welfare 
issues 
In what policy areas is the 
agency active? (The following 
policy areas were coded as 
social welfare: 
– Social security 
– Health 
– Housing 
– Recreation 
– Education) 
None of the social welfare 
options was selected (0), at 
least one of the social wel-
fare options was selected (1) 
.47 
(.56) 
(.55) 
.00 
(1.00) 
(1.00) 
.50 
(.50) 
(.50) 
0 
(0) 
(0) 
1 
(1) 
(1) 
177 
(120) 
(121) 
Note: The variable information with an N of 121 represents the values of the variables when only the cases in the HRM Auto-
nomy model 6 are included (see table 3). The variable information with an N of 120 represents the values of the variables when 
only the cases in the financial autonomy model 6 are included (see table 2). The third version of the variable values is valid when 
all agencies that have answered that specific question are included, that is for a maximum of 181.  
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TABLE A2, INCLUDED VARIABLES BASED ON OTHER KINDS OF DATA 
VARIABLE SOURCE POSSIBLE ANSWERS   MEDIAN STD. 
DIV. 
MIN. MAX. N 
Politicization See “Data” The DG does not have a political background 
(0), the DG has a political background (1) 
.26 
(.24) 
(.23) 
.00 
(.00) 
(.00) 
.44 
(.43) 
(.42) 
0 
(0) 
(0) 
1 
(1) 
(1) 
217 
(120) 
(121) 
Budget The Swedish 
National 
Financial 
Management 
Authority 
(ESV) 
Swedish crowns (SEK). Logged and normal-
ized so that the values run between 0 and 1. 
.56 
(.57) 
(.57) 
.57 
(.57) 
(.57) 
.13 
(.10) 
(.11) 
0 
(.36) 
(.36) 
1 
(.92) 
(.92) 
236 
(120) 
(121) 
Agency board The Govern-
ment’s Survey 
Support 
(Statskontoret) 
2008 
No agency board (0), agency board (1) .36 
(.38) 
(.38) 
.00 
(.00) 
(.00) 
.48 
(.49) 
(.49) 
0 
(0) 
(0) 
1 
(1) 
(1) 
256 
(120) 
(121) 
County 
administrative 
board 
 Not a county administrative board (0), county 
administrative board (1) 
.08 
(.08) 
(.08) 
.00 
(.00) 
(.00) 
.27 
(.28) 
(.28) 
0 
(0) 
(0) 
1 
(1) 
(1) 
256 
(120) 
(121) 
University  Not a university (0), university (1) .14 
(.19) 
(.19) 
.00 
(.00) 
(.00) 
.35 
(.40) 
(.39) 
0 
(0) 
(0) 
1 
(1) 
(1) 
256 
(120) 
(121) 
Note: The variable information with an N of 121 represents the values of the variables when only the cases in the HRM Auto-
nomy model 6 are included (see table 3). The variable information with an N of 120 represents the values of the variables when 
only the cases in the financial autonomy model 6 are included (see table 2). The third version of the variable values is valid when 
all agencies that there is information about are included, that is for a maximum of 256. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
